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STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants - Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010987-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001). On January 22,2002, 
the matter was transferred to this Court by the supreme court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)Q (Supp. 2001). R. 112. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Plaintiffs alleged injuries arose out of, are connected with, or resulted from his 
incarceration in the state prison. For this reason, the trial court was correct to dismiss the 
plaintiffs negligence claims because the State of Utah, Department of Corrections, 
Division of Correctional Industries (State) was entitled to immunity under Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 2001). 
This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35, 40-41, 74-79) 
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue R. 90, 92-93. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's 
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give 
the trial courts1 ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zionfs 
First National Bank v. Fox & Co.. 942 P.2d 324, 326 (Utah 1997). 
2. The plaintiffs attempted cause of action directly under the federal constitution 
was properly dismissed because the State of Utah is immune and no such cause of action 
against a sovereign state exists. 
This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35,41-43, 80-81) 
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue. R. 90, 92-93. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's 
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give 
the trial courts' ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zion's 
First National Bank, 942 P.2d at 326. 
3. The trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs state 
constitutional claim because of the plaintiffs failure to raise such claim in his notice of 
claim. 
This issue was not raised in the trial court, but is raised for the first time on appeal. 
2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be 
raised at any time by either party or by the court. Weiser v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 932 
P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1997). While this issue was not raised in the trial court, this Court 
can affirm the decision of the trial court on this related, alternative, ground. Buehner 
Block Company v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988); State v. South, 
924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
4. The plaintiff failed to allege a cause of action under the Utah Constitution for 
unnecessary rigor where the facts alleged in the complaint state only a claim for 
negligence. 
This issue was raised by the State in its motion to dismiss (R. 34-35,43-48, 81-84) 
and the trial court granted this motion, in part, based upon this issue. R. 90, 92-93. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the State's 
motion to dismiss. Because this issue raises only questions of law, the Court should give 
the trial courts' ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. Zion's 
First National Bank, 942 P.2d at 326. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend. VIII [Bail - Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 9 [Excessive bail and fines - Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall 
not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) Definitions. (Supp. 2001) 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a 
government or governmental function, or could be performed by private 
enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, 
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1) Immunity of governmental entities from 
suit. (1997) 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by 
negligent act or omission of employee - Exceptions. (Supp. 2001) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, 
or other place of legal confinement; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
John Richards brought this action against the State and Waste Management of 
Utah, Inc. R. 1-10. Richards alleged that he had been seriously injured as the result of an 
accident that occurred while he was involved in vocational training as an inmate of the 
Utah State Prison. R. 3, ffif 7-11. He sought recovery against the State for the alleged 
4 
negligence of its employees and for the alleged infliction of cruel and unusual punishment 
upon an inmate. R. 4-5, ffif 14-20; 7-9,ffl[ 30-42. 
Richard's notice of claim stated only claims for negligence and violation of federal 
law. R. 14-15. The notice of claim did not state any intent to bring an action under Utah 
Const, art. I, § 9. 
The State filed a motion to dismiss this action on August 6, 2001. R. 34-50. This 
motion was granted by the trial court. R. 90-94. In its order of November 6, 2001, the 
trial court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), expressly determined that there was no just 
reason to delay and certified the dismissal of the State as a final judgment. R. 92-93. The 
plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on December 5,2001. R. 95-96. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
11
 At all times material hereto, John Richards was an inmate" in the custody of the 
State. R. 1, f^ 1. He "was an inmate at the Utah State Prison under the custody, care, and 
subject to the supervision of the Utah State Department of Corrections." R. 3, ^  7. At the 
time of his alleged accident, Richards was "engaged in a training program administered" 
by the State. R. 3, ^  8. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a forklift, operated by a 
fellow inmate, overturned onto the plaintiff causing his injuries. R. 3,1ffi 10-12. 
Plaintiffs negligence claim against the State is based on allegations that the State 
failed to properly train and supervise the inmates during their participation in the training 
program and failed to warn the plaintiff of these dangerous conditions. R. 4,1fl[ 15-19. 
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The plaintiffs constitutional claims are based upon this same allegation of a failure to 
properly supervise inmates in the use of a forklift that they were not properly trained to 
operate. R. 8, ffi[ 34-36. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff alleged that he was injured when a forklift overturned in a prison 
training program because the inmates were inadequately supervised and trained. 
Plaintiffs negligence claim was properly dismissed because immunity has been retained 
for injuries arising out of, connected with or resulting from the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison. It is undisputed that the plaintiff, and the operator of the 
forklift, were inmates of the Utah State Prison participating in a prison program. This 
meets the statutory definition of "governmental function" and such immunity is not 
unconstitutional. 
Plaintiff, admitting that his federal constitutional claim cannot be brought under 
section 1983, instead asks this Court to create a Bivens type federal action against the 
State of Utah. Bivens actions can only be brought against federal employees. Neither the 
government nor private corporations and citizens can be made defendants in such actions. 
Further, the State of Utah would be entitled to absolute sovereign immunity. 
The plaintiffs notice of claim failed to identify any intention to bring a state 
constitutional claim. Thus the court has no jurisdiction to consider such a claim where 
the plaintiff has failed to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirement. 
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Finally, the plaintiffs claims of failure to adequately train and supervise inmates 
involved in a prison training program do not arise to the level of a violation of either 
Utah's cruel and unusual punishment or its unnecessary rigor provisions. The plaintiff, 
both in the trial court and on appeal, failed to present any clearly established law that 
would show that such negligence would violate either of these provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES AROSE OUT OF, IN 
CONNECTION WITH OR RESULTED FROM HIS 
INCARCERATION AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
The plaintiffs first cause of action against the State sounds in tort. R. 4-5. The 
State of Utah's immunity has not been waived for intentional torts. Atiya v. Salt Lake 
County, 852 P.2d 1007, 1011 (Utah App. 1993). The only possible waiver of immunity 
that might be applicable to the plaintiffs tort claim would be that found in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 (Supp. 2001) for the negligence of government employees. 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied a three-step approach to determining whether 
or not immunity is applicable to a specific case. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist.. 849 
P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). The first step is to determine whether the activity 
performed by the entity is a governmental function. The second step requires a 
determination of whether there is an applicable waiver of immunity. If such a waiver 
exists, the third step is to determine whether immunity has been retained by an applicable 
exception to the waiver of immunity. 
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A. The Complained of Actions were a Governmental Function 
The Governmental Immunity Act expressly defines all actions by governmental 
entities as being governmental functions. 
(4)(a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, 
failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as 
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique to 
government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not essential to a 
government or governmental function, or could be performed by private 
enterprise or private persons. 
(b) A "governmental function" may be performed by any department, 
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4) (Supp. 2001). This definition is very inclusive. The 
operation of a training program for incarcerated individuals comes within the statutory 
definition of "governmental function" and the first step is thereby satisfied. 
Instead of even mentioning the statutory definition of what is a governmental 
function, the plaintiff relies upon an outdated and overturned judicial interpretation of 
what that phrase means. In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 605 P.2d 1230, 1236 
(Utah 1980), relied upon by the plaintiff, the court established the "core governmental 
function" test. This test was adopted as a matter of statutory interpretation of the phrase 
"governmental function" in the immunity act. But, as noted in Ledfors, the 1987 statutory 
definition of a "governmental function" was enacted with the intent of rejecting the 
Standiford test. 
In 1987, the legislature broadened the definition of "governmental function" 
in section 63-30-2(4) to include all governmental operations that under our 
8 
prior case law construing the pre-1987 statutory language, conceivably 
could have been characterized as ineligible for immunity. Comparing the 
language in our pre-1987 case law with the language of the 1987 
amendment leaves no doubt that our pre-1987 cases were the target of this 
amendment. 
Ledfors, 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993). In Ledfors, the court applied the statutory 
definition of "governmental function" in lieu of the rejected pre-1987 case law definition 
found in Standiford. Therefore the plaintiffs reliance on the Standiford test is misplaced. 
Nor is there any constitutional infirmity in applying this statutory definition to the 
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections. Under the courts' interpretation of the 
open courts clause (Utah Const, art. I, § 11), the first question is whether the challenged 
statute has abrogated a remedy that existed at the time the statute was enacted. Day v. 
State of Utah, 980 P.2d 1171, 1184 (Utah 1999). 
It is undisputed that at no time did a common law cause of action exist to sue the 
State of Utah. Tiede v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 503-4 (Utah 1996) (immunity of the 
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections does not violate state constitution). 
Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of the common law. From the time the 
common law was adopted by Utah until the present day, Utah's common law has 
recognized the ongoing viability of sovereign immunity. The State had absolute 
immunity at common law and could not be sued without its consent. All action 
undertaken by the State of Utah was considered to be a governmental function. See 
Tiede: Campbell v. Pack. 15 Utah 2d 161, 389 P.2d 464,465 (1964) (school district, as 
9 
an agent of the State, partakes of the state's absolute sovereign immunity); Bingham v. 
Bd.ofEduc. 118 Utah 582, 223 P.2d 432,435 (1950) (all acts of a school board, as an 
agent of the State, are governmental functions and it is unlike a municipal corporation 
that has a dual character and can exercise either governmental or proprietary functions); 
State v. Dist. Court. Fourth Jud. Dist. 78 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1937) (state immune from 
both damage and injunctive claims at common law); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road 
Comm'n. 70 P.2d 857, 861 (Utah 1937); Decorso v. Thomas, 50 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 
1935); Wilkinson v. State. 134 P. 626, 630 (Utah 1913). 
For these reasons, the trial court was correct when it held that the State's conduct 
challenged by the plaintiff in his first cause of action was a governmental function for 
which immunity has been retained. 
B. The Challenged Actions Arose out of, in Connection with, and Resulted From the 
Plaintiffs Incarceration in the State Prison 
The plaintiff claims that the waiver of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30-10 (2001) is applicable. This statute waives immunity for injuries proximately caused 
by the negligence of government employees, unless the injury "arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from" one of a list of exceptions to this waiver. One such 
exception in subsection 10 is for injuries arising out of, connected with, or resulting from 
"the incarceration of any person in any state prison." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) 
(Supp. 2001). 
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Utah's courts have repeatedly held that the statutory retention of immunity applies 
regardless of the particular type of negligence that the plaintiff may claim, or how the 
plaintiff may style his claims. The important question is not the type of negligence 
alleged, but rather whether the injuries arose out, are connected with or result from the 
incarceration of any person in the state prison. In Ledfors. the court explained: 
Again, our prior cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose out 
of1 conduct or a situation specifically described in one of the subparts of 
63-30-10; if it did, then immunity is preserved. We have rejected claims 
that have reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury 
In sum, the Ledforses ignore the fact that the structure of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-10, focuses on the 
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of 
liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged. Because 
Richie's injuries arose out of a battery, we cannot ignore the plain meaning 
and fair import of section 63-30-10 of the Act. 
Id. at 1166-67 (citing Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 316,445 P.2d 367, 368 
(1968)). See also Maddocks v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1987) 
(rejecting argument that assault and battery exception did not apply to claim that two 
police officers negligently failed to intervene to prevent beating of plaintiff by another 
officer). 
The Utah Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Malcolm v. State. 878 
P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Utah 1994); S.H. v. State. 865 P.2d 1363,1364-65 (Utah 1993); 
Petersen v. Bd. of Educ. 855 P.2d 241,242-43 (Utah 1993); and Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County. 855 P.2d 231,240-41 (Utah 1993). In each of these decisions, the court 
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reiterated that the question of whether the retention of immunities under section 10 is 
applicable is determined not by considering the type of negligence alleged, but rather 
looking to whether or not the complained-of injuries arose out of one of the listed 
situations or conducts found in section 10. 
Finally, in Taylor v. Qgden School District, 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996), the court 
expressly defined what was meant by the statutory phrase "arose out of." 
Taylor maintains that the assault exception should not apply because 
Zacharyfs injuries have a greater link to the dangerous window in the 
restroom than to Trenton's assault. However, "arises out of1 within the 
assault exception ,ffis a phrase of much broader significance than "caused 
by.1"" Under the phrase's ordinary meaning, the assault need not be the sole 
cause of the injury to except the governmental entity from liability for the 
injury. The language demands '"only that there be some causal relationship 
between the injury and the risk"1 provided for. 
Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 (citations omitted). 
Most recently, the Utah Supreme Court held that injuries received from an 
avalanche caused by the naturally occurring snow pack on federal land "arose out of1 a 
"natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands" (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(11) (Supp. 2001)). 
Further, Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first 
avalanche. Under the statute, the "arise out of1 language requires only that 
there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury. In 
other words, but for the snow pack and the first avalanche, Blackner would 
not have suffered injury. Here, were it not for the first avalanche, Payne 
would not have stopped Blackner and others from proceeding up the 
canyon. In addition, if the snow pack had not been situated on public land 
above Route 210, it would not have resulted in either avalanche, which 
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caused Payne to stop traffic from moving up the canyon and directly 
occasioned Blackness injuries. 
Blackner v. State of Utah, 2002 UT 44, [^15 (citations omitted) (a copy is attached hereto 
as Addendum A). 
It cannot be disputed that but for the plaintiffs incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison, he would not have been participating in a training program under the supervision 
of the Division of Correctional Industries. There is more than simply some causal nexus 
between the plaintiffs incarceration, the incarceration of the inmate who is alleged to 
have injured the plaintiff through his negligent operation of a forklift, and the complained 
of injuries. 
Even if this were not so, the statute gives three alternative relationships between 
the injury and the retention of immunity for the incarceration of any person in the Utah 
State Prison of which "arises out o f is only one, "connection with" and "results from" 
being the others. "Connection" is defined as "3. anything that connects; connecting part; 
link; bond." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language 432 
(1996). "Result" is defined as "1. to spring, arise, or proceed as a consequence of actions, 
circumstances, premises, etc.; be the outcome." Webster at 1642. 
An injury suffered during a prison-sponsored training program was clearly 
"connected with" the incarceration of a person in the state prison. The cause and effect 
connection between the plaintiffs injuries and his incarceration (and that of the inmate 
who was driving the forklift) cannot be disputed. This relationship is more than sufficient 
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to demonstrate a connecting link or bond between the incarceration of a person in any 
state prison and the plaintiffs injuries. 
Further, the plaintiffs injuries clearly "resulted from" the incarceration of a person 
in a state prison. Plaintiffs complaint expressly alleges that his injuries were caused by 
the failure of the State to train and supervise inmates involved in a prison training 
program. The claimed injuries were the consequence, the outcome, of the incarceration 
of a person in a state prison. 
Interpreting broadly these two phrases, as this Court in Taylor, explained "arises 
out o f must be interpreted, makes it clear that the trial court correctly determined that the 
State's governmental immunity had been retained and the plaintiffs first cause of action 
was correctly dismissed. 
Nor is the fact that the plaintiff was injured outside the confines of the Utah State 
Prison significant. In Kirk v. State. 784 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Utah App. 1989), this Court 
explained that the retention of immunity applied when an incarcerated person was under 
the control of the state. 
Either Gardner had "totally escaped the control of the prison and was thus 
acting on his own so the prison was not responsible for him" or "he was still 
under the control of the prison authorities ... in which latter instance the 
prison is immune from suit under the statute." 
Id. at 1257. The plaintiff expressly claims that he was injured because the State failed to 
adequately supervise and train the plaintiff and his fellow inmates. There is no claim that 
the plaintiff or his fellow inmates had totally escaped the control of the State. The trial 
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court correctly determined that immunity had been retained relative to the plaintiffs first 
cause of action and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
II. THE STATE OF UTAH AND ITS AGENCIES 
CANNOT BE SUED DIRECTLY UNDER THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FOR DAMAGES 
In his third cause of action (R. 7-9), the plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the 
State of Utah and its Department of Corrections for alleged violations of both his federal 
and state constitutional rights. In the trial court, the State sought dismissal of the federal 
claim on the grounds that no such cause of action existed. R. 41-43, 80-81. As to the 
state constitutional claim, the State argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim 
because he had only factually alleged a claim for simple negligence. R. 43-48, 81-84. 
Unfortunately, the plaintiff conflates these two very distinct questions in his brief. 
Appellants Brief at 20-26. Whether a direct cause of action against the State of Utah 
exists under the federal constitution is unrelated to the question of whether the plaintiff 
has stated a cause of action against the State of Utah under a self-executing provision of 
Utah's Constitution. 
Claims that a federal right has been violated by someone acting under color of 
state law must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the State of Utah and its agencies 
cannot be sued under this statute.1 In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police. 491 
1
 Under the proper circumstances, state employees may be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, but this the plaintiff has not sought to do. Instead, he has sought to sue the State of 
Utah and its agencies directly. 
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U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Supreme Court expressly held that "neither a State nor its officials 
acting in their official capacities are 'persons1 under § 1983." Utah's Supreme Court, 
following Will has also concluded that § 1983 claims cannot be brought against state 
agencies because they are not "persons" under the statute. Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of 
Educ. 858 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Utah 1993). 
In an effort to circumvent these decisions, the plaintiff asks this Court to create a 
new cause of action. He asks this Court to create a direct cause of action under the 
federal constitution against a sovereign state. Appellant's Brief at 24. The plaintiff urges 
this Court to "do what the Supreme Court did in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 403 U.S. 388 (1971V' Id What plaintiff fails to 
understand is that Bivens-type actions cannot be brought against the government, only 
against federal employees. 
"A Bivens claim is a cause of action brought directly under the United States 
Constitution against a federal official acting in his or her individual capacity for 
violations of constitutionally protected rights" Buford v. Runvon. 160F.3d 1199, 1203 
n.6 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko. 534 U.S.61, 
122 S. Ct. 515, 521 (2001) ("The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers 
from committing constitutional violations.") 
In Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mever. 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (FDIC), the 
court was asked to create a Bivens-type action against the government. In determining 
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whether such a cause of action should be created, the court determined that it must 
examine two issues. "The first inquiry is whether there has been a waiver of sovereign 
immunity. If there has been such a waiver, as in this case, the second inquiry comes into 
play - that is, whether the source of substantive law upon which the claimant relies 
provides an avenue for relief." Id at 484. 
A. The Sovereign Immunity of the State of Utah Has Not Been Waived 
As a matter of federal law, the State of Utah is entitled to absolute sovereign 
immunity. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits federal 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits by private parties against a state. Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida. 517 U.S. 44 (1995); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 327 U.S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana. 323 U.S. 
459 (1945); Watson v. Univ. of Utah Medical Ctr.. 75 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1996). This 
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief 
sought. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy. Inc.. 506 U.S. 139 
(1993); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. 
and Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home Ass'n. 450 U.S. 147 (1981); Alabama v. Push. 438 U.S. 781 (1978); and Missouri 
v. Fiske. 290 U.S. 18 (1933). States are immune from suits from Native American tribes 
and foreign states as well. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775 (1991); 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. 292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
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Despite the narrowness of its terms, since Hans we haive understood the 
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the 
States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the 
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty; and that a 
State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has 
consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention." 
Blatchford.501U.S.at779. 
Because the State of Utah's sovereign immunity, no federal claim can be brought 
against the state unless its immunity has been waived. Sovereign immunity can be 
waived by Congress in certain circumstances, and by the states themselves. 
Congress can waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity "by making its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Dellmuth v. Muth. 491 U.S. 
223, 227-28 (1989). But the only time that Congress can waive Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is when it is acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Green v. Mansour. 
474 U.S. 64 (1985). The only congressional power that has been held, to date, to validly 
authorize Congress to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). If Congress does not have the authority to 
waive the immunity of the states in federal court, it is without the power to waive their 
immunity in state courts as well. Alden v. Maine. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). Of most 
importance to the present action is the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a 
waiver of the immunity of the states. Quern v. Jordan. 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979). 
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Because Congress has not waived the immunity of Utah for a direct claim under the 
federal constitution, no such cause of action can exist unless Utah has waived its own 
immunity. 
While the states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, such waivers will 
not be inferred easily. The United States Supreme Court has said: "we will find waiver 
only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications 
from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'" Florida 
Dep t^ of Health. 450 U.S. at 150 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). 
A state does not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting a statute 
authorizing suits against the state in its own courts. IdL Utah, far from waiving its 
sovereign immunity, has expressly stated in the Governmental Immunity Act that its 
immunity is retained for injuries arising out of, connected with or resulting from a 
violation of civil rights. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (Supp. 2001). 
Because the State of Utah would be entitled to sovereign immunity, no Bivens 
cause of action can be brought against it and the trial court correctly dismissed the 
plaintiffs third cause of action in so far as it sought to state such a federal claim. 
B, Bivens-Type Actions Can Only Be Brought Against Federal Officers 
Even if the State of Utah was not immune from suit under federal law, the United 
States Supreme Court has expressly rejected attempts to extend Bivens-type claims to 
government or others who are not federal employees. In FDIC, the United States 
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Supreme Court expressly held that a federal agency could not be a defendant in a Bivens 
action, even though the agency's sovereign immunity had been waived. 
Myer's real complaint is that Pattullo, like many Bivens defendants, 
invoked the protection of qualified immunity. But Bivens clearly 
contemplated that official immunity would be raised. More importantly, 
Meyer's proposed "solution" - essentially the circumvention of qualified 
immunity - would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather than 
its extension. It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to deter 
the officer. If we were to imply a damages action directly against federal 
agencies, thereby permitting claimants to bypass qualified immunity, there 
would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions against 
individual officers. Under Meyer's regime, the deterrent effects of the 
Bivens remedy would be lost. 
Finally, a damages remedy against federal agencies would be 
inappropriate even if such a remedy were consistent with Bivens. Here, 
unlike in Bivens, there are "special factors counselling hesitation" in the 
creation of a damages remedy. If we were to recogni2:e a direct action for 
damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a potentially 
enormous financial burden for the Federal Government.... We leave it to 
Congress to weigh the implications of such a significant expansion of 
Government liability. 
FDIC 114 S. Ct. at 1005-6 (citations omitted). 
These same two considerations weigh against the creation of a Bivens action 
against the State of Utah. First, the plaintiff could have brought a civil rights action under 
section 1983 against individual employees of the State of Utah. While these defendants 
would have been permitted to raise various immunities as defenses to such a claim, 
permitting the plaintiff to circumvent these defenses by suing the State of Utah directly is 
incompatible with the purposes behind such defenses. 
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Second, Congress has not seen fit to waive the immunity of the State of Utah and 
create such a direct cause of action. Instead, Congress has made the affirmative decision 
to instead provide only a cause of action against state employees under section 1983. Nor 
has the Legislature of the State of Utah seen fit to waive the state's immunity. 
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko. 534 U.S. 61,122 S. Ct. 515 (2001), the 
court again held that only federal employees can be sued in a Bivens action. Malesko 
rejected an attempt to bring a Bivens action against a private corporation that contracted 
with the federal government to provide a community correctional facility. The court 
reiterated that the purpose behind Bivens was to deter constitutional wrongdoing by 
individual federal officers. "For if a corporate defendant is available for suit, claimants 
will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual directly responsible for the 
alleged injury." Malesko, 122 S. Ct. at 521. 
Just as the United States Supreme Court has held that it would be inappropriate to 
create a Bivens cause of action against the government or private individuals, the trial 
court was correct to dismiss the plaintiffs efforts to bring a Bivens action against the 
State. 
For this reason the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs third claim, so far as it is 
based on a purported federal cause of action similar to Bivens, should be affirmed. 
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III. THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
CONCERNING HIS STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSE OF 
ACTION DEPRIVED THE COURTS OF JURISDICTION OVER 
THIS CLAIM 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have held that the filing of the notices of claim required by the Act is a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Lamarr v. Utah State 
Dep'tofTransp.. 828 P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County J 999 UT 36, |18, 977 P.2d 1201; Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 
(Utah 1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 
540-42; Rushton, 1999 UT 36, If 19; Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 
480,482 (Utah 1975). 
At the relevant time, the Governmental Immunity Act required that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2001) (in part). The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that the requirement of filing a notice of claim is very broad and applies comprehensively 
to many types of actions. 
The Immunity Act defines injury as "death, injury to a person, damage to or 
loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
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or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). The language "any other injury that 
a person may suffer," in addition to the generalized enumerated categories 
listed in the definition indicates an intent to draw a broad net over the 
multitudinous harms that plaintiffs might allege against government 
officials. 
Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49,1fl9, 26 P.3d 217 (court without jurisdiction to consider 
statutory forfeiture claim due to plaintiffs failure to file a notice of claim). 
While the plaintiff filed a notice of claim before commencing this action, it only 
gave notice that he would bring a negligence action against the State (R. 14-15) and a 
claim "for a violation of John Richards [sic] constitutional rights guaranteed under the 
Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 
USCS § 1983 against cruel and unusual punishment." R. 14. No mention of a cause of 
action under Utah Const, art. I, § 9 is made in the notice of claim. 
The courts are without jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs state constitutional claim 
because it is beyond the scope of the notice of claim that was filed. The notice did not 
articulate any intent to bring a state constitutional claim, only a federal civil rights claim 
and a claim for negligence. The state constitutional claim is beyond the scope of the 
notice of claim that was filed and it failed to give the courts jurisdiction to consider the 
plaintiffs third cause of action in so far as it is based on a state constitutional claim. 
Stralevv.Hallidav. 2000 UT App 38, UU12-17 ,997 P.2d 338 (failure of timely filed 
notice of claim to include claim that individual acted with fraud or malice was a 
jurisdictional defect for which the suit was properly dismissed: "A proper notice of claim 
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must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction.11); Yearslev v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990) (action is barred on any claim not within the scope of the notice of 
claim filed); White v. Heber City, 82 Utah 547,26 P.2d 333, 335 (1933) (causes of action 
for damages not raised in first, timely, notice of claim were not properly before the court); 
Sweet v. Salt Lake City. 43 Utah 306,134 P. 1167,1172 (1913) ("What we do hold, 
however, is that where the claimant seeks to recover for a different item or element of 
damages, as in this case, he cannot do so for the reason that such item or element is not 
described or referred to in the original claim presented to the city council").2 
A claim for violation of a state constitutional right is a common law cause of 
action the same as a tort claim. 
We begin by identifying the source of our authority to award 
damages for constitutional violations. Except for the Takings Clause, the 
Utah Constitution does not expressly provide damage remedies for 
constitutional violations. Thus, aside from the Takings Clause, there is no 
textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers a constitutional 
tort In the absence of applicable constitutional or statutory authority, 
Utah courts employ the common law. . . . Hence, a Utah court's ability to 
award damages for violation of a self-executing constitutional provision 
rests on the common law. 
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87,1J20,16 P.3d 533. 
2
 While White and Sweet were decided under prior statutes, the Utah Supreme 
Court has expressly stated that the statutes in question are "substantively similar to the 
provision now in effect" and that "these cases demonstrate that both before and since 
enactment of the Government Immunity Act, plaintiffs may sue the state and its 
subdivisions only by complying exactly with the statutory requirements provided to do 
so." Hallv.Dep'tofCorrs.. 2001 UT 34, ^ |24 n.6, 24 P.3d 419. 
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Any cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessary rigor cause of action that the 
plaintiff may have for damages is founded on the common law, and not directly upon the 
state constitution as is an action under the Takings Clause. As such, the notice of claim 
provision of the Immunity Act applies. 
In regards to such claims, the legislature has the right to implement "any rule or 
regulation in regard to the remedy which does not, under pretense of modifying or 
regulating it, take away or impair the right itself." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 736 
(Utah 1996) abrogated in part on other grounds by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box 
Elder Sch. Dist. 2000 UT 87, 1J20 n.5, 16 P.3d 533. Requiring that a constitutional 
common law action meet the procedural requirements of the Immunity Act is such an 
appropriate rule or regulation. 
Regardless of whether the State of Utah may or may not be entitled to sovereign 
immunity from a suit brought under the state constitution, the plaintiff was still required 
to provide notice of his intent to bring such a suit. In Hall v. Utah State Department of 
Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 419, the court expressly held that the substantive 
immunity of the state did not protect it from lawsuits under the Whistleblower Act. Id. at 
[^18. But even though substantive immunity did not apply, the court upheld the dismissal 
of the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the procedural 
requirement that he file a notice of claim before filing his action. Id, at 1(21-27. In 
reaching this decision, the court stressed the very real and important purposes that the 
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notice of claim requirement fulfilled. Id. at TJ22-23 (prevent payment of spurious claims, 
permit government ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the 
injury). 
This Court reached the same conclusion in rejecting a plaintiffs argument that he 
was not required to file a notice of claim because there was no substantive sovereign 
immunity applicable to his cause of action, 
However, Nielson confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the 
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. Complying with the 
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no way co-extensive with 
the substantive provisions contained within the Governmental Immunity 
Act which insulate the sovereign and its operatives from liability. 
Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130, 135 (Utah App. 1995) (emphasis in original). 
The Governmental Immunity Act is applicable to the plaintiffs state common law 
constitutional claim. To hold otherwise would be to create a unique exception from the 
legislatively created system for handling all claims against Utah and its political 
subdivisions and would cause confusion as to which claims for money or damages came 
under the Immunity Act and which did not. Utah's legislature has not made such an 
exception in this case and the plaintiff is consequently required to comply with the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Because the plaintiff failed to provide a notice of claim to the State concerning any 
claim of violation of his rights under Utah Const, art. I, § 9, the courts are without 
jurisdiction to consider this claim and the same was properly dismissed. 
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IV. NEGLIGENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM 
UNDER ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
While alleging that his injuries resulted from the negligence and carelessness of 
unnamed state employees (R. 4-5), the plaintiff also seeks to state a cause of action for 
violation of the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution. "Excessive bail shall 
not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. But in doing so, plaintiff makes only the 
factual claim that the State failed to adequately train and supervise inmates using a 
forklift. R. 8. Factual allegations of simple negligence are not enough to state a claim 
that the plaintiff was treated with unnecessary rigor. 
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Meet the Flagrant Violation Test of Spackman 
In Spackman v. Board of Education of the Box Elder County School District, 2000 
UT 87,16 P.3d 533, the court held that common law damage actions to enforce self-
executing state constitutional rights exist only in appropriate circumstances. The first of 
three limitations placed on such claims was that the violation must be flagrant. 
First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant" 
violation of his or her constitutional rights. In essence, this means that a 
defendant must have violated "clearly established" constitutional rights "of 
which a reasonable person would have known." To be considered clearly 
established, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." The requirements that the unconstitutional conduct be "flagrant" 
ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary "human 
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frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering 
[him or her]self liable for a constitutional violation." 
IcLatU23. 
The only allegations of fact made by the plaintiff in his complaint are that the State 
failed to adequately train and supervise inmates working with a forklift in a training 
program. Plaintiff has completely failed to allege any facts indicating that a reasonable 
person would have understood such allegations of negligent conduct would constitute a 
"clearly established" violation of the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment and not to be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
The "flagrant" violation test used by the Utah Supreme Court is nothing more nor 
less than the common law qualified immunity test used under federal law in section 1983 
and Bivens actions. Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For this reason, the 
State submits that federal and state decisions concerning qualified immunity are pertinent 
to whether or not the plaintiff has stated a "flagrant" violation in the present action. In 
Hilliard v. City and County of Denver. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) the court 
explained, under qualified immunity law, what is meant by the requirement that the 
plaintiff demonstrate that the alleged violation was clearly established. 
It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court that the law was clearly 
established. In doing so, the plaintiff cannot simply identify a clearly 
established right in the abstract and allege that the defendant has violated it. 
Instead, the plaintiff "must demonstrate a substantial correspondence 
between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing that 
the defendant's actions were clearly prohibited." While the plaintiff need 
not show that the specific action at issue has previously been held unlawful, 
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the alleged unlawfulness must be "apparent" in light of preexisting law. 
The "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." If the 
plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that the law allegedly violated was clearly 
established, the plaintiff is not allowed to proceed with the suit. 
930 F.2d at 1518 (citations omitted). 
The "preexisting law" which must show the unlawfulness of the alleged 
misconduct must be case law. To be clearly established, the case law must be such that a 
reasonable person would be able to recognize that his or her conduct had been declared 
unconstitutional by prior court decisions. "For the law to be 'clearly established,1 there 
'must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established 
weight of authority from other courts must be as plaintiff maintains.1" Holland v. 
Harrington. 268 F.3d 1179,1189 n.13 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Horstkoetter v. Dep't of 
Pub. Safety. 159 F.3d 1265,1278 (10th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff must demonstrate through 
binding precedent, or the weight of authority of other jurisdictions, that the right alleged 
was clearly established); Foote v. Spiegel 118 F.3d 1416, 1424 (10th Cir. 1997) (contours 
of alleged right, as established by controlling authority, must be "sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right"); 
D^Aguanno v. Gallagher. 50 F.3d 877, 881 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The remaining cases on 
which plaintiffs rely do not come from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals, or the Florida Supreme Court and, therefore, cannot show that 
plaintiffs' right to due process was clearly established."). 
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Plaintiff fails to identify even one prior court decision that would clearly establish 
that a failure to adequately train and supervise inmates in a prison training program 
constitutes either cruel and unusual punishment or unnecessarily rigorous treatment. 
Instead, without any supporting authorities, he contends that Utah law establishes 
standards for the operation of heavy equipment. Appellant's Brief at 26. Such an abstract 
general proposition is inadequate to state a claim. What plaintiff must to show, by 
binding legal authority, is that Utah's Constitutional prohibition against unnecessary rigor 
has been found to be violated by a failure to adequately train and supervise inmates in a 
workplace environment. This he has completely failed to do on appeal and in the trial 
court. 
We said in Lassiter that the most common error we encounter in qualified 
immunity cases involves the point that "courts must not permit plaintiffs to 
discharge their burden by referring to general rules and to the violation of 
abstract 'rights.'" we emphasized that "[g]eneral propositions have little to 
do with the concept of qualified immunity" and that the facts of a case 
relied upon to clearly establish the law must "be materially similar," 
because "[p]ublic officials are not obligated to be creative or imaginative in 
drawing analogies from previously decided cases." 
Hamilton v. Cannon. 80 F.3d 1525, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
The trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs third cause of action as far as it 
sought to plead a state constitutional claim and that dismissal should be affirmed. 
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B. No Facts Demonstrating Cruel and Unusual Punishment or Unnecessarily 
Rigorous Treatment Were Alleged in the Complaint 
Even if the plaintiff had met the flagrant violation test of Spademan, the trial court 
was still correct to dismiss his state constitutional claim because the factual allegations of 
the complaint did not state a claim that the plaintiff had been subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment or treated with unnecessary rigor. Utah's cruel and unusual 
punishment, unnecessary rigor, clause was originally understood "to prohibit only certain 
methods of punishment, including torture, that were deemed barbaric." State v. Gardner, 
947 P.2d 630, 636 (Utah 1997). It has been extended to prohibit punishments that are 
grossly disproportionate or that are excessive. Id at 638. 
In the "conditions of confinement" area, cruel and unusual punishment must be 
shown by evidence that the prison employee "acted with deliberate indifference or 
inflicted unnecessary abuse" upon an inmate. Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732, 740 (Utah 
1996). Plaintiff seeks to read too much into the words "deliberate indifference." This 
standard was borrowed from the identical "cruel and unusual punishment" provision of 
the federal constitution. 
Precisely what constitutes deliberate indifference on the part of prison 
officials has been the subject of some debate. It is at least clear that mere 
negligence or inadvertence is insufficient to satisfy this standard. Indeed, 
deliberate indifference requires the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain." In the work assignment context, prison officials are deliberately 
indifferent when they '"knowingly... compel convicts to perform physical 
labor ... which is beyond their strength, or which constitutes a danger to 
their... health, or which is unduly painful.1" Thus, whatever its exact 
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contours, deliberate indifference requires a highly culpable state of mind 
approaching actual intent. 
Choate v. Lockhart. 7 F.3d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993). 
In Choate the court held that claims that a prison failed to take adequate safety 
precautions on a worksite did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. IdL at 1375-
76. To prove such a claim would require that there be evidence of knowledge of 
"extreme dangers at the worksite" that were intentionally ignored. Id at 1375. The only 
fact alleged by the plaintiff is that inadequate training and supervision led to a forklift 
being mishandled and overturning on a prison worksite. The trial court correctly 
dismissed this cause of action for failure to state a claim. 
Nor did the plaintiff adequately allege facts that would show that he had been 
treated with unnecessary rigor. This standard targets the infliction of unnecessary abuse. 
Bott 922 P.2d at 740-41. "Under this standard, the main consideration is 'whether a 
particular prison or police practice would be recognized as an abuse to the extent that it 
cannot be justified by necessity.1 The definition of 'abuse' focuses on 'needlessly harsh, 
degrading, or dehumanizing1 treatment of prisoners. Id at 740. 
The plaintiffs factual allegations, that inmates in a prison training program were 
inadequately trained and supervised, does not meet the definition of abuse under this 
standard. No facts were alleged that would even begin to show that the plaintiffs 
treatment was needlessly degrading or dehumanizing. Nor has he alleged facts that his 
treatment was unconstitutionally harsh. The unnecessary rigor standard does not apply to 
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these circumstances. It is not "a catch-all provision applicable to every adverse condition 
accompanying confinement. Rather, it serves to prohibit extreme instances of 
mistreatment and abuse.11 McQueen v. State. 711 N.E.2d 503, 505 (Ind. 1999). An 
industrial accident allegedly caused by inadequate training and supervision does not come 
within this definition of extreme mistreatment and abuse. The trial court correctly 
dismissed the plaintiffs state constitutional claim and that decision should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the trial court's decision, dismissing this action 
with prejudice as to the State, should be affirmed. 
DEFENDANT STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT DESIRE 
ORAL ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant-appellee State of Utah does not request oral argument and a published 
opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already been decided 
by the courts in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a published 
opinion are necessary, though the defendant desires to participate in oral argument if such 
is held by the Court. 
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ADDENDUM "A 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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RUSSON, Justice: 
111 Paul Blackner ("Blackner") appeals from an order granting summary judgment to defendants the Town of 
Alta, Utah ("Alta"), and the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
U2 On March 14,1998, an avalanche ("the first avalanche") thundered down on State Route 210, a two-lane 
road, in the White Pine Chutes area of Little Cottonwood Canyon near Alta. It buried part of the road, blocking 
the downhill lane of traffic. Soon thereafter, the avalanche was reported to Alta's Central Dispatch Office. 
1J3 Kevin Payne ("Payne"), an Alta Deputy Marshal, was notified of the first avalanche and responded within 
minutes. Upon arrival, Payne noticed that only one lane of traffic was open and became concerned that 
vehicles traveling in opposite directions on State Route 210 would collide with one another in the avalanche 
area. Therefore, he began to direct traffic. Several minutes after Payne arrived on the scene, Dave Medara 
("Medara"), an avalanche forecaster with UDOT, who was also notified of the first avalanche, arrived on the 
scene. After discussing the situation with Payne, Medara departed to assess other slide activity lower in the 
canyon. 
114 Several minutes later, a front-end loader was dispatched from the Snowbird Ski Area to remove the snow 
from the road. While the loader was clearing the road, traffic on both sides of the first avalanche was stopped. 
Payne instructed travelers in the canyon-including Blackner, who had been driving up Little Cottonwood 
Canyon-to stop while the loader continued to work. As Blackner and others waited for the loader to finish 
clearing the road, they exited their vehicles and stood on the roadside to watch the road-clearing activities. 
1J5 After evaluating the slide activity lower in the canyon, Medara traveled up the canyon until he arrived at an 
area just below the scene of the first avalanche. This was the same area where Blackner and the other 
travelers had exited their vehicles. Medara became concerned when he noticed that the stopped vehicles, 
including Blackner's vehicle, were located under a known avalanche slide area. Medara therefore informed 
Payne by radio that he was concerned about the safety of his location and asked how long the loader would 
continue working. 
1J6 Seconds after Payne told Medara that the loader was taking its last scoop, a second avalanche occurred ("the second avalanche"). The second avalanche inundated the area where Medara and Blackner had stopped 
their vehicles. Many people, including Medara and Blackner, were caught in and overwhelmed by the second 
avalanche. Blackner was seriously injured. About thirty-four minutes passed between the first avalanche and 
the second avalanche. Both of the avalanches originated on public land managed by the National Forest 
Service as part of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest. 
H7 Blackner brought suit against UDOT and Alta, alleging that their negligence in managing the first avalanche 
resulted in his injuries. Both UDOT and Alta moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Act") barred Blackner's claims against them. Specifically, UDOT and Alta asserted that they 
were immune from suit because subsections 63-30-10(11) and (13) of the Utah Code preclude suits against 
governmental entities for injuries arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from (1) any natural condition 
on publicly owned or controlled land and (2) the management of natural disasters. The trial court granted the 
motions for summary judgment under both subsections of the Act. Blackner appeals. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1J8 Summary judgment is proper only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, U 15, 
P.3d . When reviewing whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we accord the trial 
court's legal conclusions no deference and review those conclusions for correctness. Ault 2002 UT 33 at U15. 
Furthermore, a trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness. State 
ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County. 2002 UT 8, H 8, P.3d ; State v. Luskt 
2001 UT102,U11,37P.3d1103. 
ANALYSIS 
1J9 The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting UDOT and Alta summary judgment under subsections 63-30-10(11) and (13) of the Act. Specifically, the issue is whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted the exceptions set forth in those subsections in holding that UDOT and Alta are immune 
from suit on Blackner's negligence claim because Blackner's injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or 
resulted from a natural condition on public lands or the management of a natural disaster. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(11), (13) (1997). 
1J10 Generally, to determine whether a governmental entity is immune from suit under the Act, we apply a 
three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether 
governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that 
waiver. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist, 927 P.2d 159,162 (Utah 1996); Keeaan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 
619-20 (Utah 1995). However, in this case, the parties do not dispute whether immunity has been waived, but 
rather dispute only whether an exception to that waiver applies pursuant to the third part of the test. Thus, we 
address only the issue of whether a specific exception applies to the waiver of immunity. 
1J11 The relevant portion of the Act provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, [or] 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters 
Id. (emphasis added). We first resolve whether UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit under 
subsection (11), and if they are immune, we need not address whether they are immune under subsection 
(13). 
1J12 To resolve whether the trial court erred in concluding that UDOT and Alta were immune from Blackner's 
suit under subsection (11) because his injuries arose out of, were connected with, or resulted from a natural 
condition on publicly owned or controlled land, we must determine whether the trial court correctly interpreted 
section 63-30-10(11) of the Utah Code. When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first 
looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous. 
State v. Lusk, 2001 UT 102, H 19, 37 P.3d 1103; City of Hildale v. Cooke. 2001 UT 56, U 36, 28 P.3d 697. The 
statute's language plainly states that all governmental entities are immune from suit for a government 
employee's negligence when the plaintiffs injury arose from, was connected with, or resulted from a "natural 
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(11) (1997). 
1J13 Blackner does not argue that the first avalanche was not a natural condition. Rather, he contends that the 
negligence of UDOT and Alta was the proximate cause of his injuries instead of that avalanche. However, 
Blackner's argument either miscomprehends or misapplies the plain language of the Act. The Act 
unequivocally provides that when a plaintiffs injury either "arises out of[] [or] in connection with, or results 
from" a "natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands," governmental immunity is retained with 
respect to any action to recover for injuries proximately caused by a government employee's negligence. The 
application of the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does not hinge on 
whether the "natural condition" in any way "proximately caused" the plaintiffs injuries. See id. 
1J14 In the instant case, even assuming that the actions of Payne and Medara were negligent and proximately 
caused Blackner's injuries, UDOT and Alta are immune from suit to recover for those injuries because 
Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled land. The first avalanche 
and the snow pack from which both avalanches originated were natural conditions. The snow pack was 
situated on Forest Service land, and the first avalanche partially covered and blocked Route 210, a state-
owned-and-controlled road. 
1J15 Further, Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first avalanche. Under the statute, the 
"arise out of language requires only that there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury. 
Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist. 927 P.2d 159,163 (Utah 1996). In other words, but for the snow pack and the 
first avalanche, Blackner would not have suffered injury. See id. Here, were it not for the first avalanche, Payne 
would not have stopped Blackner and others from proceeding up the canyon. In addition, if the snow pack had 
not been situated on public land above Route 210, it would not have resulted in either avalanche, which 
caused Payne to stop traffic from moving up the canyon and directly occasioned Blackner's injuries. 
1116 Therefore, Blackner's injuries arose out of a natural condition existing on publicly owned or controlled land. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that UDOT and Alta are immune from Blackner's suit because 
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity applies to Blackner's injuries 
regardless of whether Payne and Medara were negligent.111 
CONCLUSION 
1J17 The trial court correctly granted UDOT and Alta summary judgment under the Governmental Immunity Act 
because Blackner's injuries arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from a natural condition on 
publicly owned or controlled land. We therefore affirm. 
1J18 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Howe, and Justice Wilkins concur in 
Justice Russon's opinion. 
1. Blackner also contends on appeal that if we were to affirm the trial court's summary judgment order in this 
case, our affirmance would be contrary to public policy. However, Blackner never raised this argument before 
the trial court and has thus waived the argument on appeal. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, n.5, 38 P.3d 291; Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, fl 15, 26 P.3d 212. 
